Our security posture
What the software does with your patients' data, and where that data lives.
Last reviewed: September 2026
Doctavie handles prescriptions, lab results and medication lists. This page describes the engineering decisions made to protect them — not intentions, but what the code does today.
We claim no certification. We describe mechanisms, which an audit you commission can check.
Identifiable data does not leave the pharmacy
In Doctavie Pharmacy, an insured person's name, their Chifa card number and their credit slate are stored on the pharmacy's own machine — never in the cloud. This is not a setting: the browser data layer simply does not expose those tables, and no path in the code would send them anywhere.
What does synchronise is deliberately anonymous: quantities, amounts, product references. The identifiable half stays on the counter PC, which is the direct reading of Algeria’s loi 18-07.
Each practice sees only its own records
Isolation between accounts is enforced by the database itself, table by table, rather than by the interface. A request forged from a browser returns no more than a screen shows — because the same control answers both.
That is an architectural choice: a check in the UI is scenery, and we did not want a system whose confidentiality depended on a button behaving.
A verifiable prescription, and a record of who saw it
Every electronic prescription carries a cryptographic seal, so a pharmacist can confirm it has not been altered since it was written. The public verification page is rate-limited so it cannot become a way to enumerate prescriptions.
Dispensations are written to a log, and the patient reads that same log in their own app. When a pharmacy asks to see a patient’s record, the patient answers from their phone, and the request is recorded whether they agree or not.
The pharmacy's internal network is encrypted
When several counters in one pharmacy talk to each other, the link is encrypted and the counter verifies the server's identity by fingerprint rather than by trust. A pharmacy network is precisely the one whose threat model is « another machine here ».
On the web, responses carry the headers that prevent a sign-in screen being framed invisibly and that force HTTPS.
Our diagnostics do not see your patients
Error reports are scrubbed before they are sent: patient identifiers, page addresses and request contents are removed. A technical fault reaches us without the record it happened on.
The same rule governs the counter assistant: the question leaves without an insurance number, and the credit slate, the customer and the identifiable half of a sale never leave the machine.
We audit, and we fix what we find
The code is subject to regular security audits, and findings become fixes rather than notes. We publish this page because a health system that says nothing about its security is asking for trust it has not argued for.
An internal audit is not a third-party penetration test, and we do not pretend otherwise.
Report a vulnerability
If you believe you have found a flaw, write to us before publishing it. We answer, we fix, and we tell you what was done.
security@doctavie.com
